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NOTES
Martin's Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem
Trading USA, Co.:
Gray Market Goods;
Reason Makes a Run for the Border
I. Introduction
Businesses spend many years and millions of dollars building
the value and strength of their trademarks. As a result, it is no
surprise that these businesses also seek to reap from their
trademarks as great a benefit as the law will allow. In the area of
gray market goods,' the question of most significance to
businesses is what benefit the law will allow: to what extent can
trademark owners exclude gray market goods from the U.S.
market?
The importation of gray market goods has a substantial impact
on the U.S. economy.2 Some commentators accordingly believe
that trademark law should bar gray market goods completely.'
One commentator has defined gray market goods as:
Goods manufactured by a trademark owner, or his authorized agent, but
ultimately sold in the United States without that trademark owner's authority.
These goods can be differentiated from counterfeit goods (goods to which
trademarks have been affixed without the authority of the trademark owner) by
the fact that the gray market goods were manufactured and the trademark
affixed with the authority of the trademark owner.
Seth Lipner, Trademarked Goods and Their Gray Market Equivalents: Should Product
Differences Result in the Barring of Unauthorized Goodsfrom the U.S. Markets?, 18
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1029, 1029 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
2 It is difficult to measure the extent of this impact. However, critics of the gray
market estimate the damage to U.S. commercial industry in the billions of dollars. See
Shashank Upadhye, Rewriting the Lanham TrademarkAct to Prohibit the Importationof
All Gray Market Goods, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.59, 60 (1996) ("In 1994, the
International Trade commission stated that the gray market ,cost the industry between
sixty to eighty billion dollars, a substantial increase from a 1987 cost of ten billion
dollars." (citations omitted)).
3 See, e.g., Upadhye, supra note 2, at 66 ("[F]urther interpretations of the Lanham
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Others argue that such an exclusionary policy cannot be supported
by the principles of trademark law and would lead to substantial
anticompetitive effects. Most courts adopt the latter view, and
require that some level of difference exist between the authorized
and unauthorized goods before they allow trademark law to
prohibit the importation of genuine goods And while the courts
enunciate a standard of material difference, the application of this
standard to certain goods is far from a simple matter.
The Fifth Circuit recently demonstrated the difficulty of
applying the material difference standard in Martin's Herend
Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co.6 The court
held that a material difference could be found based merely on
patent stylistic differences between luxury goods and gray market
equivalents.7 In so doing, the Fifth Circuit extended to U.S.
Act will only exacerbate the gray market problem and, consequently, the only
practicable solution is to remove all ambiguities and to bar them completely."); Hugh C.
Hansen, Gray Market Goods: A Lighter Shade ofBlack, 13 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 249, 26265 (1987) (symposium) (arguing that fundamental trademark policies are undermined by
gray market imports).
4 See Gilbert Lee Sandier, Gray Market Goods: The Controversy Will Continue,
13 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 267, 272 (1987) (edited version of speech delivered at a
symposium) ("If we have very real and specific problems, we should propose very real
and specific solutions for those problems. We shouldn't be eliminating the broad sweep
of trade which has been beneficial to the U.S. consumer and the U.S. public."); Lipner,
supra note 1, at 1054 ("If trademark law is used to enjoin gray market sales without
proof that the gray market goods are substantially different from the authorized goods,
trademark law will have the effect of suppressing competition rather than protecting
trademark rights and goodwill.").
5 See, e.g., Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633
(1st Cir. 1992) (stating "[t]erritorial protections of the Lanham Act engage where two
merchants sell physically different products in the same market and under the same
name"); Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(distinguishing cases where gray market goods are "physically identical" to the
authorized goods); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816
F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.) (affirming permanent injunction against gray market importer of
dolls because such dolls "were not intended to be sold in the United States and, most
importantly were materially different from the [dolls intended for domestic market] sold
in the United States .... It is this difference that creates the confusion over the source
of the product and results in a loss of [the trademark owner's] goodwill."), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 847 (1987); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1165-70 (1984)
(holding that because gray market camera importer did not provide point-of-sale
servicing, irreparable injury resulted to plaintiff that did provide such servicing).
6 112 F.3d 1296 (5th Cir. 1997).
7

See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
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trademark owners the greatest possible protection against gray
market goods. The cost of this protection, however, may be the
erosion of the fundamental principle of trademark law that
trademarks need be protected only insofar as to avoid consumer
confusion!
Part II of this Note will summarize the Fifth Circuit's opinion
in Martin's HerendImports.9 Part Ill will discuss the background
law in the area of gray market goods'0 and Part IV will examine
the significance of the case in this context." Part V will conclude
that the Fifth Circuit decision can only be understood to favor the
trademark owner's interest in protecting its goodwill to the
detriment of the American consumer. 2
II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts andDistrictCourt Ruling
Herendi Pocelangyar ("Herendi") is a Hungarian corporation
which manufactures fine porcelain items such as tableware and
figurines.' 3 Herendi uses a trademark on these items consisting of
a hand-painted design accompanying the HEREND name (the
"mark").' 4 The federal registration of this mark is held by
Herendi 1
In order to export its goods to the United States, Herendi
entered into an exclusive distributorship agreement with Martin's
Herend Imports, Inc. (MHI), an American corporation. 6 This
agreement authorized MHI to be the sole importer of Herend
products in the United States. 7 Although Herendi manufactures
8 See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 13-72 and accompanying text.

10 See infra notes 73-122 and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 123-41 and accompanying text.

12 See infra Part V.
13 See Martin's Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112
F.3d 1296, 1299 (5th Cir. 1997).
14 See id.
15 See id.

See id.
17 See id.
16
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"thousands of items[,]" MHlI and Herendi jointly select only a
limited number of items to import. I"
Judith and Frank Juhasz owned Diamond & Gem Trading
USA, Co. (collectively "Juhasz"). 9 Juhasz acquired genuine
Herendi goods bearing the mark from various sources, including
Herendi company stores in Hungary, private collections, and other
American sources.2 ° Juhasz then sold these goods in the United
States. 2' Although some of the goods sold by Juhasz were among
the select goods imported by MHI, many were from product lines

not selected for U.S. marketing by MHI and Herendi.22
MHI and Herendi filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas alleging trademark infringement
and false designation of origin under the Lanham Act.23 The
complaint alleged that Juhasz sold counterfeit goods, and the

president of MHI filed an accompanying affidavit stating that MHI
had purchased counterfeit goods from Juhasz. 24 Based on this
limited evidence, the court granted a temporary restraining order
and issued an ex parte order of seizure.23 Pursuant to this order,
plaintiff's counsel, assisted by U.S. marshals, conducted a raid of

18 See id.
19 See id.
20

See id. Although MHI and Herendi alleged that Juhasz had imported counterfeit

goods, Juhasz "vehemently maintained throughout this litigation that it only sold
genuine Herend porcelain, purchased from legitimate sources in this country or
elsewhere. It claim[ed] that all the goods it sold bore a true Herendi trademark and were
in fact manufactured at the Herendi factory." Id. The district court, however, decided
the issueof infringement not on the theory that the infringing goods were counterfeit,
but on a theory that they were materially different from authorized imports. Thus, the
Fifth Circuit assumed that Juhasz had imported only genuine goods bearing a valid U.S.
trademark. See id. at 1301 ("As in our case, the goods at issue in Nestle were authentic
and bore a genuine trademark.").
21 See id. at 1299.
22 See id. at 1302 (noting that "[s]ome of the pieces, such as figurines of guinea
hens and rabbits, were completely different pieces from those sold by [MHI]"). Frank
Juhasz admitted that more than 50% of the Herendi goods sold by Juhasz were not also
sold by Martin's Imports. See id.
23 See id. at 1299. See generally infra Part III.A. (discussing the Lanham Act and
trademark infringement).
24 See id.

25 See id.
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Juhasz's premises and seized "numerous goods and records."
Juhasz then filed a counterclaim for wrongful seizure.
At trial, the district court granted summary judgment to the
plaintiffs on their Lanham Act claims and on the defendant's
wrongful-seizure counterclaim.2 ' The court issued a permanent
injunction against Juhasz and accepted a jury verdict awarding
plaintiffs $685,000 in damages.29 The court further awarded the
plaintiffs attorney's fees in the amount of $328,825.30 After trial,
the court found Juhasz was violating the permanent injunction, for

which it issued a severe contempt order." Juhasz appealed to the
Fifth Circuit, challenging the five primary holdings of the district
court: (1) the grant of summary judgment on the issue of
infringement; (2) the award of damages; (3) the award of
attorney's fees; (4) the grant of summary judgment on the
wrongful-seizure counterclaim; and (5) the contempt order.
B. Fifth CircuitHolding
1. Infringement
The Fifth Circuit modified the district court's ruling on the
infringement issue as if the goods sold by Juhasz were genuine

26

Id

See id. at 1300.
21 See id.
29 See id.
30 See id. at 1305.
31 See id. at 1306. The contempt order required Juhasz to:
return all physically different Herend products and all related brochures, price
lists and other advertising materials; (2) turn over records documenting the sale
of physically different products, so that plaintiffs could in the future seek
recovery for lost revenues; (3) identify and send a letter to all persons who had
received physically different products or advertising for such products, stating
that defendants sold them in violation of the injunction; (4) pay plaintiffs $6300
as reasonable attorney's fees in bringing the contempt proceeding; (5) serve
within 12 days a declaration describing its compliance with the contempt order;
and (6) beginning 10 days after entry of the contempt order, pay a fine of $50
per day for each day of non-compliance with the order.
Id. at 1306-07.
32 See id. at 1299.
27
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goods bearing a valid U.S. trademark." The Fifth Circuit noted
that, in this situation, courts have found infringement where the
"the goods sold by the authorized domestic distributor and the
defendant's foreign goods are materially different ... .
The
court adopted this test and applied it to the goods sold by Juhasz 5
In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit first noted that the goods sold
by Juhasz were not all offered for sale in the United States by
MHI. 36 The court also focused on the luxurious character of the
HEREND products and appeared to limit its holding to cases
involving luxury goods by stating that the material differences test
"is a sound one, at least when the goods are highly artistic, luxury
goods."37 The court reasoned that marketing artistic goods is a
delicate matter, and trademarks used in connection with such
goods therefore should be given greater protection. In addition, it
characterized the exclusive distributorship agreement with MHI as
a manifestation of Herendi's control over its mark.
In light of the sensitive nature of the HEREND trademark, the
Fifth Circuit elaborated on the stylistic differences between the
authorized goods and some of the gray goods, noting that some of
the figurines sold by Juhasz were completely different shapes than
those sold by MHI, while others were painted with different
patterns and colors.40 The court held that these differences were
material as a matter of law because "consumer choices for such
artistic pieces are necessarily subjective or even fanciful,
33See id. at 1300-01.
34 Id. at 1301-02. The Fifth Circuit refers to this test as the Nestle/OAA test, citing

Societe Des ProduitsNestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1992),
and OriginalAppalachian Artworks, Inc. v. GranadaElectronics, Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir. 1987). See Martin's HerendImports, 112 F.3d at 1301. For further discussion of
these cases, see infra, Part III.B.
35See Martin'sHerendImports, 112 F.3d at 1301-02.
36 See id. at 1302.
37 Id.
38 See id. The court noted that "[flor Herendi, maintaining the goodwill of its mark
may depend on the stores where the goods are sold, advertising, the selection of which
of the thousands of Herendi pieces will be offered for sale in this country, and many
other factors." Id.
39See id.
40See id.
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depending on each consumer's personal artistic tastes.'
Having established liability for infringement, the Fifth Circuit
proceeded to consider two arguments advanced by Juhasz in
defense of its gray market activity. The court first rejected the
merit of Juhasz's argument that its goods were the same grade and
quality as the goods sold by MHI.42 The court held that identical
quality was not a defense, stating that "the plaintiff need not prove
that the defendant's imports are of inferior quality to establish
trademark infringement, only that they are materially different.""
The Fifth Circuit also rejected Juhasz's second argument, that
the first sale doctrine completely protects its activities." It noted
that generally a buyer may resell genuine goods bearing a valid
trademark without incurring trademark liability.4 However, the
court reasoned that this doctrine cannot be the controlling principle
in the context of an unauthorized gray-market importer.46 The
court observed that, otherwise, all gray-market importers would
escape liability because "unauthorized importers are never the first
seller."4' 7 Furthermore, the court recognized that prior case law
defining the doctrine of gray market goods can not be reconciled
with such a broad reading of the first sale doctrine. 8
Although the Fifth Circuit declined to apply the first sale rule
to reverse the district court's finding of infringement, Juhasz's
efforts in advancing this argument were not completely
The Fifth Circuit held that the underlying
unsuccessful. 49

41

Id. The court quoted Juhasz's argument that "'each consumer for a variety of

reasons might prefer a bird to a rabbit or stripes to diamonds or red to blue."' Id.
42 See id.
43 Id.
44 See id. at 1303.

45 See id.
46 See id.
47

Id.

48 See id. "[A]pplying the first sale rule to an unauthorized importer... would
mean the gray-market importer would always escape liability. Unauthorized importers
Yet since 1923 ... courts have held that such sales can
are never the first seller ....

sometimes violate the trademark laws." Id. For a discussion of prior case law, see infra
notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
49 See id. at 1304.
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principles behind the first sale doctrine ° are properly considered in
a gray market case and that these should apply to limit the scope of
the permanent injunction issued against Juhasz.' Thus, the Fifth
Circuit modified the district court's injunction "to allow Juhasz to
sell all pieces which have ever been sold by the plaintiffs in the
United States."52 This limitation reflects a balance drawn by the
court between the first sale doctrine and the territorial integrity of
a trademark where the trademark owner has sanctioned the sale of
a particular product in a territory. 3 As the court noted: "In such
circumstances the first sale rule's policies of limiting restraints on
trade and alienation of personal property outweigh the trademark
through an exclusive
owner's right to control 5its
4 goodwill
arrangement.
distributorship
2. Damages
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the award of damages against
Juhasz in its entirety, noting the district court has broad discretion
in awarding damages under the Lanham Act.55 While the award of
damages was based on the testimony of experts who relied on
the court nonetheless affirmed the
inconsistent evidence,56
damages award because the trial court had the discretion to change
it as appropriate."

50 The underlying rationale for the first sale doctrine is that, after the first sale of
the product, the need to protect the trademark owner's rights in the mark gives way to
public policy disfavoring restraints on the alienation of personal property. See id. at
1303.

51 See id. at 1304.
52 Id. The court also made it clear that it did not matter if Juhasz sold a particular
piece in the United States first, as long as at some point in time, MHI also sold that piece
in the United States. See id. Thus, the court stated that "[a]s long as plaintiffs have ever
approved a piece for importation and sale in this county, Juhasz is free to sell any
individual piece of the same quality from the same product line." Id.
53 See id.
54 Id.
55 See id. Under the Lanham Act, the trial court may increase the award of
damages up to three times the amount found as actual damages. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(a) (1994); Martin'sHerend Imports, 112 F.3d at 1304.
56 See Martin'sHerendImports, 112 F.3d at 1305.

57 See id.
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3. Attorney's Fees
The Fifth Circuit reversed the award of plaintiffs attorney's
fees in this case. 8 The court noted that the Lanham Act only
allows for attorney's fees in "exceptional" cases.59 As the court
noted, cases that are exceptional usually involve malicious,
fraudulent, deliberate, or willful conduct on the part of the
defendant." Because there was no evidence in this case that
Juhasz knew its actions were illegal, the award of attorney's fees
could not be sustained.6 ' Furthermore, the court pointed out that
the uncertainty in the law of gray market goods made this a
particularly unsuitable case for an award of attorney's fees.62
4. Wrongful-Seizure Counterclaim
The Fifth Circuit also reversed the entry of summary judgment
on the wrongful seizure counterclaim.63 The order of seizure was
issued pursuant to section 34 of the Lanham Act.6 Because of the
"draconian nature" of the seizure remedy, however, the court held
that it must be construed narrowly and cannot be read to authorize
the seizure of gray market goods. 65 The court noted that section 34
specifically exempts goods to which a mark is affixed by a
manufacturer authorized to use the mark." Because the plaintiffs
never established that Juhasz had sold any counterfeit goods, the
district court erred in granting summary judgment on Juhasz's

58 See id.

59 See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994).
60 See Martin'sHerend Imports, 112 F.3d at 1305 (citing Texas Pig Stands, Inc. v.
Hard Rock Cafe Int'l, Inc., 951 F.2d 684, 697 (5th Cir. 1992)).
61 See id.
62 See id. The court noted that even the district court erred in granting an overly
broad injunction and that "[t]he notion that a jeweler can violate the trademark laws by
importing and selling genuine porcelain with a genuine trademark borders on the
counterintuitive, even to those seasoned in the law." Id.
63 See id. at 1306.
61

See id. at 1305. Section 34 of the Lanham Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1116

(1994).
65

See id. at 1306.

6

See id.
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counterclaim for wrongful seizure.67
5. Contempt Order
Finally, the Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's contempt
order, despite the fact that the underlying permanent injunction
was overly broad." The court noted that the contempt order was
issued for civil rather than criminal contempt, 69 and as such, the
trial court was not required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Juhasz violated the injunctive order.7 In addition, it held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the order because
the findings of fact underlying the contempt order were not clearly
erroneous." Further, the injunction was not so vague that Juhasz
could have misunderstood its requirements.72
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Martin's Herend Imports
illuminates some new pitfalls in the area of gray market goods.
First, the decision illustrates the difficulty courts can have in
applying Lanham Act remedies in gray market cases. Second, the
court's decision warns potential gray market defendants that the
material difference standard may be controlled by the trademark
owner rather than the gray market defendant. Finally, the court's
decision cautions gray market plaintiffs that their own territorial
marketing decisions may circumscribe remedies available under
the Lanham Act against a gray market infringer. The significance
of these new pitfalls in the law of gray market goods is apparent in
the context of earlier gray market cases and the Lanham Act itself.

See id.
68 See id. at 1307. The court quoted the Supreme Court in noting that .'acontempt
proceeding does not open to reconsideration the legal or factual basis of the order
67

alleged to have been disobeyed' .....

(1948)).
id.
See id.

69 See
70

71 See id.
72

See id.

"

Id. (quoting Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 69
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III. Background Law
A. The Lanham Act and TrademarkInfringement
The statutory foundation of American trademark law is the
Lanham Trademark Act.73 Trademark owners who wish to bar
gray market imports generally bring Lanham Act claims for
infringement, importation of goods bearing infringing marks, and
unfair competition.74 Section 32 of the Lanham Trademark Acte
protects registered marks from infringement, providing that:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrantuse in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to
cause consumer confusion or to cause mistake, or to deceive...
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant...."
Thus, the touchstone of trademark infringement is the
"likelihood of consumer confusion" test." Without a finding that
consumers are likely to be confused by an allegedly infringing use,
a plaintiff cannot recover for trademark infringement. This is the
animating principle in any infringement action, even under the law
of gray market goods.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act78 provides a civil right of
action to anyone who is damaged by unfair competitive practices,

73 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).

74 Trademark owners domiciled in the United States may also use the customs laws

to exclude gray market goods. See infra note 81 (discussing 19 U.S.C. § 1526).
Presumably, this course of action was not pursued in Martin'sHerend Imports because
the U.S. registration and ownership of the Herend trademark were in Herendi, a
Hungarian corporation.
75 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994).
76 Id. § 11 14(1)(a) (emphasis added).
7 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.)
(originating a multi-factor test for likelihood of confusion), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820
(1961). See also, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts,
944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991); Lois Sportswear v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867 (2d
Cir. 1986); Frisch's Restaurant, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982).
78 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
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including false designations of origin. This section provides, in
relevant part:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representations of
fact, which(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association
of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services,
or commercial activities by another person...
shall be liable in civil action by any person who believes that he
or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.79
It is noteworthy that a likelihood of confusion is required for
liability under section 43.
Section 42 of the Lanham Act"0 prohibits the importation of
goods bearing counterfeit marks or false designations of origin.
This section provides, in relevant part:
[N]o article of imported merchandise which shall copy or
simulate the name of

.

. . any domestic manufacture, or

manufacturer, or trader, or of any manufacturer or trader located
in any foreign country which, by treaty, convention, or law
affords similar privileges to citizens of the United States, or
which shall copy or simulate a trade-mark [sic] registered in
accordance with the provisions of this Act or shall bear a name
or mark calculated to induce the public to believe that the article
is manufactured in the United States or that is manufactured in
any foreign country or locality other than the country or locality
in which it is in fact manufactured, shall be admitted to entry at
any customhouse of the United States ......
79
80

Id. § 1125(a) (1994).
Id. § 1124 (1994).

81Id. The importation of gray market goods is also regulated by section 526 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1994). See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486
U.S. 281 (1988). Section 1526 prohibits the importation of goods bearing a registered
mark owned by a person domiciled in the United States if a copy of the certificate of
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Section 42 pointedly addresses imported goods bearing
infringing marks. It does not, however, address when goods are
infringing. Thus, section 42 must be read in light of sections 32
and 43, which define infringement and false designations of origin.
B. GrayMarket Goods: A Twentieth-Century Phenomenon
The law of gray market goods reflects the territorial dimension
of trademark law. 2 Prior to the twentieth century, trademark law
did not address the fact that goods bearing marks may cross
national borders. Indeed, the origin of territoriality in U.S.
trademark law is found in a 1923 Supreme Court case, A. Bourjois
& Company v. Katzel. s In Katzel the plaintiff, an American
corporation, had purchased a French company's face powder
business in the United States as well as its registered trademarks
used in connection with the face powder.14 After re-registering the
marks in its own name, the plaintiff continued to import the
French company's face powder.85 The plaintiff marketed the face
powder in boxes which bore the mark POUDRE JAVA and which
disclosed the plaintiff's relationship to the French company. 6 The
defendant imported the French face powder and marketed it in the
original French boxes, which bore the mark POUDRE RIZ DE
JAVA. 7 The Court held that the defendant had infringed the
trademark rights of the plaintiff even though the defendant sold
registration is filed with the Secretary of the Treasury and written consent of the owner
is not produced at the time of entry. See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1994). Such goods are
subject to seizure. See id. § 1526(b) (1994). For further discussion of § 1526, see Jane
A. Restani, An Introduction to the Gray Market Controversy, 13 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 235,

236 (1987). In K Mart, the Supreme Court evaluated Treasury regulations enforcing §
1526. See K Mart,486 U.S. at 292-94. For further commentary on the K Mart decision,
see Shubha Ghosh, An Economic Analysis of the Common Control Exception to Gray
Market Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373 (1994); Donna M. Lach, The Gray
Market and the Customs Regulation-Is the Controversy Really Over After K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.?, 65 CHI.-KENT L. lRv. 221 (1989).
82 See generally Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d
633, 636-37 (1st Cir. 1992).
83

260 U.S. 689 (1923).

84 See id. at 690.
85

See id. at 690-91.

86

See id. at 691.

87 See id.
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only genuine face powder." The Court reasoned that the French
manufacturer could not have circumvented its lawful assignment
of trademark rights to the plaintiff by conspiring with a third party
to bring the face powder into the United States. Thus, the Court
concluded that "the vendors could not convey their goods free
from the restriction to which the vendors were subject."' 0 Thus,
the defendant, in purchasing from the French manufacturer, did
not acquire the right to sell the goods in the United States with the
mark affixed by the French manufacturer.9 ' The Court further
supported its holding by recognizing the territorial integrity of the
plaintiff's trademark:
It is said that the trade mark here is that of the French house and
truly indicates the origin of the goods. But that is not accurate.
It is the trade mark of the plaintiff only in the United States and
indicates in law, and, it is found, by public understanding, that
the goods come from the plaintiff although not made by it. 9'
The Court derived the territoriality principle from the nature of
trademark as a shorthand for the goodwill of the trademark
owner.93 The Katzel Court thus recognized trademark owners may
create distinct reputations in particular geographic regions, and
trademark rights are to some extent defined by national borders.
Since Katzel, many lower federal courts have recognized the
territoriality of trademarks.94 Other courts, however, have been
88 See id.
89 See id.at 691-92.
90 Id. at 692.
91
92

See id.
Id.

93 See id. ("[The trademark] stakes the reputation of the plaintiff on the character
of the goods.").
94 See, e.g., Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633,
636-37 (1st Cir. 1992) ("Without such territorial trademark protection, competitors
purveying country-specific products could exploit consumer confusion and free ride on
the goodwill of domestic trademarks with impunity."); Lever Bros. Co. v. United States,
877 F.2d 101, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Lever I) (noting that the territoriality principle
applies where two merchants sell physically different products in the same geographic
market under the same name); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs.,
Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that trademark holder may pursue remedies
against a gray market importer under § 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1526 (1982)) notwithstanding failure of customs officials to exclude gray
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hostile to this extension of trademark rights.95 This tension has led

courts to seek a guiding principle to define the territoriality
concept and to ground the law of gray market goods in the
fundamentals of trademark law.'
C. The MaterialDifferences Standard

In order to bring the law of gray market goods into accord with
the policies driving trademark law, the federal courts, in the 1980s
and early 1990s, devised a standard of product equivalence as a
proxy for the likelihood of confusion test." This approach was
first taken by the district court in Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo.98
In that case, the court held that differences in point-of-sale
servicing resulted in irreparable injury to the trademark holder."
Although the defendant sold only genuine MAMIYA cameras
under the plaintiff's mark, it did not provide warranty service,
market goods (citing Olympus Corp v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 320 (2d Cir.
1986))), cert denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp.

1163, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[A] mark may have not only a separate legal basis but
also a different factual significance in each separate country where the local mark owner
has developed an independent goodwill.").
95 See, e.g., Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 668-69 (3d Cir.)
("Katzel does not represent the establishment of a broad 'territoriality theory' applicable
to every instance in which a domestic company acquires the United States trademark for
a foreign manufactured good."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989); NEC Elecs. v. CAL
Circuit ABCO, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir.) (quoting Champion Spark Plug Co. v.
Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 128 (1947) to limit Katzel to situations where the defendant
"market[s] goods 'of one make under the trademark of another'), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
851 (1987).
96 See, e.g., Societe Des Produits Nestle, 982 F.2d at 637 ("[T]erritoriality only
goes so far ....
[C]ourts do not read Katzel... to disallow the lawful importation of
identicalforeign goods carrying a valid foreign trademark.").
97 See generally Lipner, supra note 1, at 1034. In the early 1980s, federal courts
generally refrained from applying trademark law to prohibit the importation of gray
market goods. See id. The courts gave two reasons for this position:
The first rationale is that once the goods are introduced into the stream of

commerce by the foreign markholder, its rights to control the goods, and the
rights of its close corporate affiliates to control the goods through its U.S.
trademark rights, are exhausted. Another rationale is that the goods are genuine
and the sale of genuine goods cannot cause consumer confusion as to source.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
98 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

99 See id. at 1165-70.
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product education, an inventory of peripheral equipment, or a

continuing buyer-seller relationship of service and advice. '0 The
failure to provide these services, which were provided by
authorized dealers of MAM1YA cameras, created a likelihood of
consumer confusion which caused irreparable injury to the
trademark owner.'°
Product differences also played a key role in Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. GranadaElectronics,Inc. (OAA). °2
In OAA, the Second Circuit held that Cabbage Patch dolls intended
for a foreign market could not be imported into the United States
because of significant differences between the foreign dolls and
the American dolls."3 For example, the foreign dolls contained
birth certificates and adoption papers that were not in English.O"
Furthermore, the American dolls could be adopted through United
States fulfillment houses, which would also send birthday cards to
purchasers of the American dolls. °5 Purchasers of the foreign
dolls could not take advantage of these services.' °6 The court
found that these differences "create[d] . . .confusion over the
source of the product and result[ed] in a loss of OAA's and
Coleco's good will."'0 7 The court likened the facts of the case to
Osawa, where the trademark owner's goodwill was similarly being
damaged by consumer confusion.'08
Five years after OAA, in Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v.
Casa Helvetia, Inc.,' °9 the First Circuit synthesized a test for

100

See id. at 1165-67.
101 See id. at 1168-69. In earlier litigation involving the plaintiff, the Second Circuit
required a showing of irreparable injury prior to barring the import of gray market
goods. See Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Corp., 719 F.2d 42, 46 (2d
Cir. 1983).
102 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987).
103

See id. at 73.

104See id.
105 See id.
106 See

107

id.

Id.

108 See id.; see also supra notes 97-101
109982 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1992).

and accompanying text.
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infringement in gray market cases based on product differences." '
The case involved the sale of chocolates in Puerto Rico under the
trademark PERUGINA."' This mark was owned by the plaintiff,
Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. (Nestle S.P.N.), which
authorized its affiliate Nestle Puerto Rico to market Italian-made
chocolates in Puerto Rico." 2 The defendant, however, imported
chocolates manufactured by a Venezuelan company under license
from Nestle S.P.N."3 These Venezuelan chocolates differed from
the Italian chocolates in presentation, variety, composition, and
price."4 The plaintiff filed a trademark infringement action which
the district court denied."5

In considering Nestle S.P.N.'s appeal, the First Circuit began
by stating that "any difference between the registrant's products
and the allegedly infringing gray goods that consumers would
likely consider to be relevant when purchasing a product creates a

presumption of consumer confusion sufficient to support a
Lanham Trade-Mark Act claim."" 6 The First Circuit noted that a

gray market defendant could rebut this presumption by showing
that the product differences "are not of the kind that consumers, on
' 7

average, would likely consider in purchasing the product."
Because the product differences noted by the court could
undermine consumer expectations and very well lead to consumer

I1 See id. at 640-41.
"' See id. at 635.
112 See id.
113 See id.
"4 See id. The court cataloged these differences later in its opinion. See id. at 64243. First the court noted that the shipping and handling procedures, including product
inspection procedures, were markedly different between the authorized distributor and
the defendant. See id. at 642. Also, the Italian-made version of one variety of
chocolates contained five percent more milk fat than the Venezuelan chocolates, and
other ingredients differed between the two products. See id. 'The court also noted that
the Italian chocolates came in a greater variety of shapes. See id. The packaging of the
two products differed in color, finish, illustration, and description. See id. at 643.
Finally, the court noted that the price of the products differed substantially. See id.
'5

See id. at 635-36.

116 Id. at 641.
117

Id.
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confusion, the court presumed the differences to be material." 8
Since the defendant presented no evidence to show that the
consumers did not consider these differences relevant or that
retailers explained the differences to consumers, the court reversed
the denial of plaintiff's trademark infringement claims."9
Both the OAA and Nestle cases clearly outlined a material
differences standard which the Fifth Circuit could have adopted
for its analysis in Martin'sHerend Imports.2 The Second Circuit
in OAA found that in order to find genuine gray goods infringed a
plaintiff's mark, the gray goods must differ from the authorized
goods such that consumers could be confused or disappointed by
the goods.'' And the First Circuit in Nestle defined a material
difference as one in which a consumer would find relevant in
making the purchasing decision.'
However, the Fifth Circuit
forged its own path, seemingly electing to adopt instead a much
broader definition that encompasses any product difference.
IV. Significance of the Case
The Fifth Circuit interpreted the material differences standard
to include stylistic choices made by the trademark owner and its
exclusive domestic distributor. This holding undermines the
purpose behind the material differences standard itself, which is
intended to place reasonable limits on the territoriality of
trademark law.' The real weakness in the court's decision in
Martin 's HerendImports, therefore, is the court's failure to look at
the significance of the stylistic differences to determine if there
was a real risk of consumer confusion. Consequently, the
American consumer was denied product choice because of an
overly broad application of trademark law. This anticompetitive
118 See
"9
120
121
122

id. at 643-44.

See id. at 644.
See Martin'sHerendImports, Inc., 112 F.3d at 1300-01.
See supra notes 102-19 and accompanying text.
See Nestle, 982 F.2d at 641.

123 See Lipner, supra note 1, at 1033-34 ("As courts continue to draw rational lines
concerning the degree of gray market competition which will be permissible, they must
determine the level of difference between gray market goods and authorized goods
which will be tolerated.").
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result should caution courts to enforce the material differences
standard in a more meaningful way." 4
A. MaterialDifferences Standard Undermined
The decision in Martin's Herend Imports undermines the
material differences standard by dissipating the significance of
materiality. The plaintiff in this case was able to demonstrate only
that the defendant had imported genuine Herend figurines of
different styles and color patterns than those of the authorized
In response, the defendant sought to show that a
distributor.'
consumer would not be confused by the different shapes and color
patterns.'
The defendant argued that because this case is
distinguishable from both Nestle and OAA, the stylistic differences
were obvious to the consumer and there were no hidden
differences that would be lost to the consumer because of a
reliance on the trademark.2 7 Nevertheless, the court rejected this
argument, holding stylistic differences are material in the context
of luxury goods.
In both Nestle and OAA, consumers relied on the trademark
both as a symbol of goodwill and as an indication of certain
product traits. In Nestle, the Puerto Rican consumer relied on the
PERUGINA mark as a symbol of quality, composition,
In OAA, the American consumer
configuration, and variety.'
relied on the CABBAGE PATCH mark as a symbol of the ability
to "adopt" the doll and to receive a birthday card.'29 The
defendants' goods in both of these cases to some extent preyed on
this reliance to the detriment of the consumer and the trademark
owner.
See id. at 1054 ("If trademark law is used to enjoin gray market sales without
proof that the gray market goods are substantially different from the authorized goods,
trademark law will have the effect of suppressing competition rather than protecting
trademark rights and goodwill. Courts should strive to avoid such an interpretation of
124

the law.").
125

See Martin'sHerendImports, 112 F.3d at 1302.

126

See id.

127
128

See id.
See Nestle, 982 F.2d 633, 643-44.

129

See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68,

73 (2d Cir. 1987).
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In contrast to the consumer reliance in Nestle and OAA, the
consumers of Herend porcelain did not rely on the HEREND mark
for their stylistic choice. Rather, these consumers relied on the
mark for a level of quality in the porcelain figurines. The
defendant Juhasz did not prey on this expectation but fulfilled it by
selling only genuine Herend products. For this reason, the gray
goods in this case are much like the situation of identical goods
described by the court in Nestle: "In such a situation, consumers
get exactly the bundle of characteristics that they associate with
the mark and the domestic distributor can be said to enjoy in large
measure his investment in goodwill."' 30
Thus, neither the
consumer nor the trademark owner's local goodwill were injured
by Juhasz's activity. The remaining question is whether the Fifth
Circuit's decision is consistent with trademark law.
B. Reason on the Run: TrademarkLaw Out of Control
The only rationale which can support the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Martin's Herend Imports is the protection of a
trademark owner's right to control its goodwill by territories. 3'
The rationale goes something like this: if Herendi and MHI are
unable to exclude certain styles from the U.S. market, they will be
unable to shape the perception of their mark by the American
consumer. While the courts should be sensitive to this interest, it
should not be dispositive of the issue of trademark infringement.
This interest must yield to the consumer's interest in product
choice free of anticompetitive restrictions on gray market goods. If
the gray market importer can give the consumer a style not made
available by the trademark owner, this makes the market more
competitive. 13 The benefit of this competition should not be
denied to the consumer merely to protect a trademark owner's
Nestle, 982 F.2d at 641.
131As a general matter, the issue of goodwill should be viewed in light of the first
sale rule and the fact that the trademark owner has already benefited from its goodwill to
the extent that the gray market importer has already paid a market price (albeit a foreign
market price) for the goods. See generally Martin'sHerendImports, 112 F.3d at 1303.
132 Based on a consumer choice theory, it is arguable that the OAA decision is
wrong. There are certainly Spanish-speaking consumers in the American market.
Perhaps these consumers would have been pleased to find a Cabbage Patch doll which
contained Spanish adoption papers and instructions.
130
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control of consumer perception. At the very least, a court should
find material only those differences which could result in
irreparable harm to the trademark owner.'33
Another problem that results from the Fifth Circuit's reasoning
is a conflict with the first sale doctrine.'34 The court addressed the
first sale doctrine by noting that "applying the first sale rule to an
unauthorized importer such as Juhasz would mean that the graymarket importer would always escape liability."'35 By vaguely
asserting that Katzel is inconsistent with this result,'3 6 the Fifth

Circuit distorted the relationship between gray market goods and
the first sale doctrine. Contrary to the court's position, these areas
of trademark law are not unrelated. Rather, they are related
through a meaningful application of the material difference
standard. A gray market importer who imports goods which do
not materially differ from the authorized goods should be
protected by the first sale doctrine.'37
133

Cf Lipner, supra note 1, at 1053-54. Professor Lipner proposes a differentness

test which considers the probability- of harm to the trademark owner and the seriousness
of such harm:
This proposed test addresses the full panoply of gray market cases. For
example, consumers are unlikely to feel grave disappointment if a two-dollar
battery fails to live up to expectations. If clothing or shoes are defectively
manufactured and fall apart after a short period of use, consumer anger is more
likely to increase or decrease based upon the price paid, the existence of a
discount from the "authorized" price, whether the defect was disclosed or was
discoverable at the point of purchase, and whether a refund can be obtained
from the retailer. The existence of European or metric sizing, for example,
should not be considered a material difference between gray market goods and
trademarked goods, primarily because it is readily discoverable upon a visual
inspection.
Id. at 1053 (footnotes omitted).
134 The first sale doctrine generally restricts a trademark owner from pursuing an
infringement action against a purchaser of its. goods that resells those goods. See NEC
Elecs. v. CAL Circuit ABCO, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Once a trademark
owner sells his product, the buyer ordinarily may resell the product under the original
mark without incurring any trademark law liability.").
135 Martin'sHerend Imports, 112 F.3d at 1303.
136 See id.
137 Cf NEC Elecs., 810 F.2d at 1509-10 (using the first sale doctrine as the
foundation for its gray market analysis and restricting Katzel to the particular facts of
that case in holding that a gray market importer of computer chips did not infringe on a
trademark).
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The relationship of the first sale doctrine to the gray market
reflects considerations which mitigate absolute protection from
gray market imports under trademark law. First, the trademark
owner benefits from the original purchase of the gray market
goods. 3 ' This fact demands consideration of whether a trademark
owner can protect the territoriality of its goodwill through its own
efforts. A trademark owner can protect its own interest in
territoriality by monitoring its distribution policies abroad' or by
developing different trademarks in different countries."I The court
did not consider these possibilities in Martin's HerendImports.
The Fifth Circuit, by finding stylistic differences material,
undermined the material differences standard as a limit on the
territoriality of trademarks. By doing so, the court sanctioned an
anticompetitive result which reduced consumer choice in the
market for Herend porcelain. The Ninth Circuit declined to allow
a similar result in NEC Electronics: "This country's trademark
law does not offer NEC-Japan a vehicle for establishing a
worldwide discriminatory pricing scheme simply through the
expedient of14setting up an American subsidiary with nominal title
to its mark.' '
V. Conclusion
As Professor Lipner has noted: "Courts, as a rule, have been
too hasty to enjoin sales based upon minor, or even non-existent
138

See supra note 50.

139 A policy of selling goods intended for non-U.S. markets only to wholesale

distributors who agree to sell only to non-U.S. retailers could have curtailed Juhasz gray

market activity or at least raised the cost of purchasing the gray market goods.
140 See generally Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 683 (3d Cir.
1989) (Becker, J., concurring). In Weil, Judge Becker noted that

[t]o protect Weil's interest in its American trademark, Weil's parent, Lladro,
could affix different trademarks to each corresponding level of quality, different

trademarks to those products imported into the United States by Weil and those
sold elsewhere in the world, and/or inform the public of the differences in
quality, thereby precluding the possibility of deception or confusion.
Id. (Becker, J., concurring). By analogy, Herendi could have affixed a different mark to
styles intended for the U.S. market. This course of action would have prevented Juhasz
from acquiring goods only intended for foreign markets with an American trademark

attached.
141 NEC Elecs., 810 F.2d at 1511.
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differences."'" The Fifth Circuit followed this pattern in Martin's
Herend Imports. The court did not consider the real significance
of the stylistic differences between the authorized and
unauthorized imports. There was certainly no likelihood of
confusion as to source. Indeed, the figurines originated from the
same Herendi factory in Hungary. Furthermore, it is unlikely that
a consumer would be confused by the shape or color patterns on a
Herend figurine prior to purchase. Thus, there was little chance of
irreparable injury to Herendi's goodwill. Finally, Herendi may
have been able to protect the territoriality of its goodwill through
its own efforts.
In light of its somewhat attenuated reasoning, the Fifth
Circuit's opinion can most generously be read to protect Herendi's
goodwill in the American market. The more realistic view,
however, is that the Fifth Circuit applied the material difference
test without judging whether any of the stylistic differences are
material. The result of this fast and loose approach to the gray
market was a detrimental reduction in choice for the American
consumer, a result which courts should be careful to avoid.
ARIF S. HAQ

142 Lipner, supra note 1, at 1052.

